At the recent Environment, Communities and Fire Scrutiny Committee meeting at County Hall, Councillors questioned claims that the arrangement for Surrey to control the response to West Sussex emergencies was "a success". Unfortunately, the denials and assurances sounded ever so familiar.
Groundhog Day
Groundhog Day
When the West Sussex control room was closed and the Sussex control room opened, WSFRS officers assured Councillors it would be straightforward and the Cabinet Member claimed it was a success. When reports of problems were leaked, WSFRS officers and the Cabinet member dismissed them and only admitted to "teething problems" that had been "fixed".
Lionel Barnard added that staffing was satisfactory, sickness had dropped and everything is "as we would expect it." Yet, a freedom of information request revealed a very different story, and one that would get worse.
There were also strenuous efforts, in both East and West Sussex, to keep problems with the technology secret. This went on for over four years and thousands of pounds were spent trying to fix the problems. It was only after West Sussex's Chief Fire Officer Sean Ruth left that East Sussex began to admit problems, although they blamed connections to existing systems and the old chestnut, "teething problems".
Although those who reported the original concerns believed that the problems had been fixed by 2018 and the Control Centre was working well, West Sussex decided to leave East Sussex in the lurch by abandoning the Sussex Control Centre. Rushing in to this deal with Surrey, and spending even more money, has again resulted in reports of problems with staffing and technology.
Councillors, notably Michael Jones and James Walsh, rightly questioned those assurances and asked for more detail and some evidence to support them. The question is, will the details and evidence be published to allow proper scrutiny, or will they be sent to Councillors with instructions not to reveal the detail? An all too common tactic from West Sussex County Council when they wish to cover up failures.
In an effort to try and ensure information is made public, I have submitted Freedom of Information requests to both West Sussex and Surrey. Of course they may try and keep that information secret, by using exemptions in the legislation, but if they are truly open and honest they will not. It will certainly be an interesting test of WSCC's claims to be improving their culture, especially with regard to honesty and accountability.
The meeting was told that the FBU Safety Critical Notice was just a Surrey affair and that West Sussex FBU officials had not raised any issues. That may have misled Councillors in to believing that the errors and failings had not affected West Sussex. As West Sussex firefighters had reported 'near hit' events to managers, they would have no need to report them to the FBU. That would only follow if they believed no action was being taken.
It was admitted at the meeting that there had been 'near hit' reports and a weekend system failure, but it was claimed they were not safety critical. I beg to differ. A 'near hit' report means safety was compromised, and it was only luck that meant serious consequences did not result. It is like saying a safety harness failure wasn't safety critical because the person wearing it was close to the ground and wasn't hurt.
It was disappointing to hear that some Councillors were unconcerned about these failures because "you expect teething problems". This was supposed to be a state of the art, tried and tested system, not some early stage experimental computer system. These are not "teething problems" or "bedding in" difficulties, they are failures.
Having heard the dubious claim that less staff were needed because the system relied more on system data being updated automatically, I was astonished to then hear that the data updating was unreliable. It depended on the mobile telephone network and coverage was poor in some areas. The committee was then told that they were going to switch to the Airwave system to improve the situation, but it could take three months to get the necessary licence.
So why did they go ahead before it was in place? No explanation was given. The Committee Chairman said he knew about the licence issue last July, but the meeting was told the application had not yet been submitted. That beggars belief. The mention of Airwave raises further concerns:
The committee was told that ways of working had been changed "for alignment". No detail was given, but reports suggest that West Sussex has cut their levels of protection for the public to match Surrey's poor standards.
Councillors were told that the system had a new tool for mapping risk and maintaining cover, as if that somehow made it acceptable because it is the computer that says "NO". The parameters used by the computer are determined by the supplier and should meet the requirements of the Service. If the system is as good as claimed, then it should be perfectly possible to have West Sussex standards applied, even if they are different to Surrey's.
It was concerning to hear about dependence on 'the cloud'. Whilst it is true that this may offer some benefits, it also creates new vulnerabilities. Industry experts will admit that your data could get lost, wiped, corrupted or stolen. They will of course assure you that they take security very seriously, but we have seen many large organisations, who take security seriously, suffer significant problems including denial of service, theft of data and infected systems.
I am also concerned that data obtained by West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service, which they are legally obliged to protect, is now accessible to Surrey County Council and those contractors and sub contractors used to store or transmit that data. The more people that have access, the greater the risk of unauthorised, malicious or criminal access. WSFRS obtains a lot of data from individuals and businesses that is personal data under data protection legislation, or is commercially or security sensitive.
If a GP refers a patient to another part of the NHS, the GP has to have written permission to share their details. So I wonder how many West Sussex residents and businesses have been asked if they are happy for their data to be shared with, or accessible to, other public and private organisations?
It was also disappointing to hear the Assistant Chief Fire Officer suggest that, because the control building at Haywards Heath could be used for other purposes when East Sussex move out, money had not been wasted. Finding a use for the building is not the issue, over £2 million was spent on converting it to meet the specialist needs of a fire service control facility. In addition, another £2 million of the £3.6 million Government grant was spent on equipment and work that will now be wasted.
These joint figures were published by East Sussex in 2014, so they do not include subsequent spending by both Services to fix problems. Exactly how much has never been revealed, with some costs being hidden under other budget headings. The Surrey move means that most of the money spent at Haywards Heath has been wasted, and even more is likely to be spent on converting it back to other uses.
The excuse given to Councillors for such low levels of staffing in Surrey's control was that the technology reduces the need for staff to undertake certain tasks. Yet we were also told that when the technology fails, staff can carry out those tasks. No one can predict when failures will occur, which means that when they do staffing will be hopelessly inadequate.
No matter how good the technology, it cannot replace the Control Operator's ability to gather vital information from often agitated and distressed callers and to ensure that the right help is quickly on its way. No one can predict when many callers may need that help at the same time, which means that when they do staffing will be hopelessly inadequate.
This is not a commercial call centre where staffing can be varied to match expected demand and, if demand is unexpectedly high, the only result is frustrated customers. This is a critical control room managing the fire and rescue service's response to life threatening emergencies. There is no pattern to instances of high demand, it can happen at any time of day, on any day of the week, and at any time of the year.
"There is nothing that would give me or officers cause for concern"
Cabinet Member Lionel Barnard August 2014
Lionel Barnard added that staffing was satisfactory, sickness had dropped and everything is "as we would expect it." Yet, a freedom of information request revealed a very different story, and one that would get worse.
There were also strenuous efforts, in both East and West Sussex, to keep problems with the technology secret. This went on for over four years and thousands of pounds were spent trying to fix the problems. It was only after West Sussex's Chief Fire Officer Sean Ruth left that East Sussex began to admit problems, although they blamed connections to existing systems and the old chestnut, "teething problems".
Although those who reported the original concerns believed that the problems had been fixed by 2018 and the Control Centre was working well, West Sussex decided to leave East Sussex in the lurch by abandoning the Sussex Control Centre. Rushing in to this deal with Surrey, and spending even more money, has again resulted in reports of problems with staffing and technology.
The previous assurances about the arrangements with East Sussex proved false, dishonest even,
so how can we have faith in the latest assurances about the arrangement with Surrey?
Assurances not enough, evidence is needed
Councillors, notably Michael Jones and James Walsh, rightly questioned those assurances and asked for more detail and some evidence to support them. The question is, will the details and evidence be published to allow proper scrutiny, or will they be sent to Councillors with instructions not to reveal the detail? An all too common tactic from West Sussex County Council when they wish to cover up failures.
In an effort to try and ensure information is made public, I have submitted Freedom of Information requests to both West Sussex and Surrey. Of course they may try and keep that information secret, by using exemptions in the legislation, but if they are truly open and honest they will not. It will certainly be an interesting test of WSCC's claims to be improving their culture, especially with regard to honesty and accountability.
The meeting was told that the FBU Safety Critical Notice was just a Surrey affair and that West Sussex FBU officials had not raised any issues. That may have misled Councillors in to believing that the errors and failings had not affected West Sussex. As West Sussex firefighters had reported 'near hit' events to managers, they would have no need to report them to the FBU. That would only follow if they believed no action was being taken.
It was admitted at the meeting that there had been 'near hit' reports and a weekend system failure, but it was claimed they were not safety critical. I beg to differ. A 'near hit' report means safety was compromised, and it was only luck that meant serious consequences did not result. It is like saying a safety harness failure wasn't safety critical because the person wearing it was close to the ground and wasn't hurt.
It was disappointing to hear that some Councillors were unconcerned about these failures because "you expect teething problems". This was supposed to be a state of the art, tried and tested system, not some early stage experimental computer system. These are not "teething problems" or "bedding in" difficulties, they are failures.
Failures of concept, of planning, of testing, of training,
of implementation, of data validation, or all of those.
When lives depend on a system, such failures are unacceptable.
Having heard the dubious claim that less staff were needed because the system relied more on system data being updated automatically, I was astonished to then hear that the data updating was unreliable. It depended on the mobile telephone network and coverage was poor in some areas. The committee was then told that they were going to switch to the Airwave system to improve the situation, but it could take three months to get the necessary licence.
So why did they go ahead before it was in place? No explanation was given. The Committee Chairman said he knew about the licence issue last July, but the meeting was told the application had not yet been submitted. That beggars belief. The mention of Airwave raises further concerns:
- Airwave is basically a mobile telephone system that also does not have 100% coverage.
- Like other mobile telephone systems, Airwave can experience failures and overload.
- Airwave is due to be replaced by the Emergency Services Network, which is yet another mobile telephone system that has yet to be fully tested.
West Sussex residents less safe
Leaving busier fire stations without a fire engine is not a 'culture change',
it is a downgrading of the service provided to West Sussex residents.
Councillors were told that the system had a new tool for mapping risk and maintaining cover, as if that somehow made it acceptable because it is the computer that says "NO". The parameters used by the computer are determined by the supplier and should meet the requirements of the Service. If the system is as good as claimed, then it should be perfectly possible to have West Sussex standards applied, even if they are different to Surrey's.
It was concerning to hear about dependence on 'the cloud'. Whilst it is true that this may offer some benefits, it also creates new vulnerabilities. Industry experts will admit that your data could get lost, wiped, corrupted or stolen. They will of course assure you that they take security very seriously, but we have seen many large organisations, who take security seriously, suffer significant problems including denial of service, theft of data and infected systems.
For many years fire services ensured that their control room systems were isolated and protected.
Now they are happy to put them at risk to save a bit of money.
I am also concerned that data obtained by West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service, which they are legally obliged to protect, is now accessible to Surrey County Council and those contractors and sub contractors used to store or transmit that data. The more people that have access, the greater the risk of unauthorised, malicious or criminal access. WSFRS obtains a lot of data from individuals and businesses that is personal data under data protection legislation, or is commercially or security sensitive.
If a GP refers a patient to another part of the NHS, the GP has to have written permission to share their details. So I wonder how many West Sussex residents and businesses have been asked if they are happy for their data to be shared with, or accessible to, other public and private organisations?
Over £4 million wasted
These joint figures were published by East Sussex in 2014, so they do not include subsequent spending by both Services to fix problems. Exactly how much has never been revealed, with some costs being hidden under other budget headings. The Surrey move means that most of the money spent at Haywards Heath has been wasted, and even more is likely to be spent on converting it back to other uses.
Inadequate staffing levels a major threat to safety
The excuse given to Councillors for such low levels of staffing in Surrey's control was that the technology reduces the need for staff to undertake certain tasks. Yet we were also told that when the technology fails, staff can carry out those tasks. No one can predict when failures will occur, which means that when they do staffing will be hopelessly inadequate.
No matter how good the technology, it cannot replace the Control Operator's ability to gather vital information from often agitated and distressed callers and to ensure that the right help is quickly on its way. No one can predict when many callers may need that help at the same time, which means that when they do staffing will be hopelessly inadequate.
This is not a commercial call centre where staffing can be varied to match expected demand and, if demand is unexpectedly high, the only result is frustrated customers. This is a critical control room managing the fire and rescue service's response to life threatening emergencies. There is no pattern to instances of high demand, it can happen at any time of day, on any day of the week, and at any time of the year.
There are not enough staff in the Surrey Control Room to safely deal with emergencies in Surrey and West Sussex. It will be even worse when they also deal with East Sussex emergencies.
Relative workload per Operator on minimum staffing
(last column assumes minimum increased by one, as it did when West Sussex joined)
Not enough Control Operators to answer calls for help means
people in danger wait longer for Firefighters to arrive
people in danger wait longer for Firefighters to arrive
