Not a report, just a Councillors’ Comfort Blanket

Well it seems that Councillors on the Environmental and Community Services Select Committee failed to carry out a proper review of last year's cuts, and simply accepted the misleading report presented by the Chief Fire Officer last week. 

Quite frankly a complete farce, designed to be a comfort blanket to help Councillors sleep easy in their beds. Never mind the public often having to wait longer for help to arrive, or firefighters facing increased danger, because their crew size has been cut and assistance is coming from further away.

Sadly I am not surprised. A report, put together by the same people who recommended the cuts, is hardly going to admit their proposals have made things worse. Similarly, the Select Committee that failed to properly assess the proposals, and then approved them, is hardly going to admit they got it wrong.

Did any Councillors challenge the report? With the meeting not available in the Council's webcast library, we have no way of seeing if they did or not. Having said that, the ruling group on the County Council has a reputation for dismissing any challenges and voting as instructed. 

Another example of a complete lack of transparency and accountability, which I am sure the Police & Crime Commissioner will use to strengthen her case to take over the running of the fire & rescue service! The County Council may protest about the take over, but they ineptly continue to make it easier for her.

For those who want to know why the report was such a whitewash, consider the following:

Summary 1. The report authors improperly say that discussion by Members should be restricted to the "actual outcomes against the expected outcomes". To be a proper review, all the effects resulting from the cuts should be examined and discussed. 2. There are no reports from the representative bodies, so balanced consideration of the effects is not possible. 3. The wording for some of the expected outcomes in this report differ from that in the final report to the Select Committee in 2014. This is inconsistent and no explanation is given for the change. 4. Most of the statistics only cover 2014/15 and 2015/16, which, as WSFRS has said before, is unrepresentative. It is quite inappropriate to draw any conclusions without showing data for at least the previous five years. 5. This is especially inappropriate, as WSFRS has previously stated that the data for 2014/15 is unrepresentative, because industrial action had an adverse effect on their performance. In addition, the freeze on vacant posts ahead of Future Fire & Rescue 2 will also have had an adverse effect on performance that year. 6. There are a few examples where three or four years are referred to in the report, but the selection of the additional data for those examples is questionable and unexplained. 7. Data appears to have been selected and presented in a way that some negative effects are concealed and positive ones are misrepresented. 8. Previous statistical data referred to average (or mean) figures, but this report is using median figures. That means they cannot be properly compared. Median figures may well appear better than average figures. 9. Essential data, which would indicate if the outcomes had been achieved and identify any adverse effects, has been omitted. Examples include: Proposal 1 – there is no data at all in relation to the outcome at Horsham. Proposal 2 – no data for the second immediate response appliances at Crawley and Worthing. Proposal 3 – no data on the impact of the changes on first appliance response times. Proposal 4 – no data on the impact of the changes to third appliance response times at Crawley. Proposal 5 – no data on response times and community safety work. Proposal 6 – no data on operational capacity and support for communities. Proposal 7 – no data on work or time lost as a result of the changes. Proposal 8 – no data on the use of additional trained staff to improve operational resilience. In short, this report is incomplete and misleading. It also lacks sufficient accurate data to justify the conclusions shown.  Detailed comments Scope of review Any review of major change must be in depth, unrestricted, and especially not limited to just the ‘expected outcomes’. Unexpected outcomes, knock on effects and overall performance must also be considered? The views of those directly affected by the change must be considered, as they can often have a better insight regarding the real effects. In particular, the representative bodies (Fire Brigades Union, Retained Firefighters Union, and Unison) should have been invited to submit their observations. There have been worrying reports that the personnel reductions are undermining initial and continuation training, with personnel running out of specialist qualifications. That is also reported to have resulted in some fire appliances responding to calls without a crew able to deploy breathing apparatus. The response times will hide this serious deficiency, as that appliance may well have arrived within the target time, but rescue and effective firefighting will have been considerably delayed until an appliance from another station arrives. Concern has also been voiced about special appliance availability being similarly affected. All such concerns should be fully reviewed by the Committee. It is also odd that the wording for some of the expected outcomes is not consistent in the Consultation Document, the final report to the Select Committee in 2014, and in this report (see table at the end for detail). In the following sections, I have used the outcome’s that were notified to the public. Selection of data WSFRS has often criticised the use of statistics for just two adjacent years, because they say they are unrepresentative. Whilst such figures are of some use for a simple year to year comparison, they are clearly not representative of trends and should not be used to draw conclusions. To identify the true overall effect of cuts, they must show the figures for at least the five years before Fire Redesign in 2010 and for all subsequent years. The use of just 2014/15 data to indicate the situation before the Future Fire & Rescue 2 cuts is even more dubious, as WSFRS has previously claimed that industrial action meant that performance was poor and data for 2014/15 unrepresentative. That year’s figures will also have been undermined by the freeze on vacant posts that preceded the decision on FFR 2. It is accepted that with post-change data only being for one year, that cannot be used to draw full conclusions. However, it can indicate areas of concern that should be addressed or monitored. It is particularly important that the Select Committee also fully review the effects for at least another four years. Median or average data The change from average to median data is a concern, as that means they cannot be properly compared. Now this may just be confusion on the part of the authors, as 2.6.8 refers to “median (average)”, which suggests they are the same, but they are not. Average is the arithmetic mean, whereas median is the midway point between, for example, the quickest and slowest response time. A simple illustration of how use of the median can mislead would be five response times of 5, 7, 8, 15, and 20 minutes. The median is 8 minutes, but the proper average is 11 minutes. It is essential that this is clarified to ensure that data is consistent across the years. It would also be helpful to gain perspective on average figures, if the best and worst times were also shown. Mitigation Much was made of things that would be done to mitigate the effect of the changes, yet the report fails to mention what has actually been done, or how effective it has been. For example, the plan to send the 4x4 with additional personnel to critical calls in the Midhurst, Petworth and Storrington areas. Has that been done for every critical call, has it been effective etc?  All the actions proposed to mitigate the effect of cutting crews should be reviewed to see if they have been effective, or if more measures are required. 2.6. Proposal 1 - Move one of the two immediate response fire engines at Horsham to Littlehampton, making it a 24-hour immediate response station No fire engine was moved, only firefighters were moved or cut. The public were told that this proposal, “Improves Service performance by more effective use of resources”. To justify that the effect on both Horsham and Littlehampton should be reviewed, but there is no data provided for Horsham. Thus only showing improvements, whilst hiding performance deterioration. Response times for a second appliance, will have generally increased by four minutes for both day and night calls at Horsham. By contrast, the four minute reduction at Littlehampton is only for night calls. Average response times for a second appliance in Horsham’s area have not been published, but their second appliance’s availability has been. This will clearly have an adverse effect on response times, so it is concerning that availability has dropped from 100% in 2014/15 (when it was wholetime crewed) to 76% in 2015/16 (now that it is RDS crewed). With no mention of Horsham, the conclusion for proposal 1 is simply false. In addition: 2.6.6 – Had the performance figures for the first appliance at Littlehampton been shown for previous years, instead of just the previous year, the improvement would be negligible (2012/13 = 99.96%, 2013/14 = 100%). The unusual drop in 2014/15 was almost certainly a consequence of not filling vacancies and disillusionment amongst personnel whilst changes were being discussed. 2.6.8 – Littlehampton’s first appliance crewing was changed from immediate response in the day and retained response at night, to round the clock immediate response, thus removing the extra 4 minutes on response times at night. There was also a considerable capital and revenue cost with this proposal, so to only have an improved overall response time of just 28 seconds is worrying. 2.7. Proposal 2 - Introduce ‘Group-Crewing’ model at immediate response stations: Bognor Regis, Chichester, Crawley, Horsham, Littlehampton and Worthing. This claimed there would be “Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance”, but no evidence was offered to support that contention in the Modelling and Analysis Technical Report. The claim that the change would “maintain existing crewing levels where possible” was always a questionable claim and concern was voiced during the consultation. Riding with four firefighters, instead of five, for 60% of the time is far from maintaining existing crewing levels. It is also concerning that the prediction claimed in 2.7.5 has not previously been published. 2.7.3 According to this report the first year was “predicted to be a year of adjustment”, so why were Members not told of these predicted issues in the final report to the Select Committee in 2014? 2.7.7 The figures for 2014/15 may well have been adversely affected by the freeze on filling vacancies ahead of FFR, so it is not a fair comparison. In addition, the Chief Fire Officer has previously claimed that industrial action increased response times in 2014/15, so this will also have contributed to performance being abnormally low that year.  2.7.8 The second fire engines at Crawley and Worthing were also affected by this change, but the second fire engine response times and availability have not been included. It is understood that those second fire engines have not always been crewed, and that they have also been sent to other station areas to provide cover, thus removing cover from Crawley and Worthing.  This is important data in relation to determining if the outcome has been achieved. 2.7.9 The conclusions are illogical. The Littlehampton improvement is claimed to be “almost certainly” due to the change in crewing, but the deterioration at Chichester is claimed to be “variations in performance from year to year”. So the 2015/16 improvement at 5 of the 6 stations could in fact just be a one off favourable variation in performance, which may deteriorate next year. 2.8 Proposal 3 - Remove the 2nd fire engines at Midhurst, Petworth and Storrington, leaving one fire engine and 4x4 vehicle at each station The response times for the first appliances at these stations are also likely to be have been affected by the change, but no data is provided. Removing 50% of the appliances in this area significantly reduces resilience, so when the only remaining appliance at each station is not available (at another call, standing by at another station, or has no crew) the response time for the first appliance to arrive at a call will increase significantly. A proper assessment of the outcome of this proposal must include the change in first appliance response times. 2.8.3 This claims that “critical attendance standards have been maintained”, but the 2015/16 figure is actually 3% below target. Figures prior to 2014/15 are also needed, if a proper assessment is to be made. 2.8.5 The claim was that this proposal would have a “minimal impact on performance”, yet response times for second appliances have fallen dramatically. Not meeting response times on 62%, 79% and 90% of occasions indicates a serious impact on performance. This is very worrying when you realise that, for most of these station areas, that means taking longer than 17 minutes to arrive. 2.9 Proposal 4 - Closure of retained unit and removal of 3rd fire engine at Crawley. Based on low utilisation it does not contribute significantly to overall performance and existing emergency cover arrangements 2.9.2 The claim that “whenever both appliances are attached to incidents, a standby appliance is mobilised to Crawley” is not supported by evidence. It cannot be, as whenever statistics for appliance movements for standby purposes have been requested by Members or others, they are told that such movements are not recorded. Once again, only the previous year’s response times are shown, instead of several preceding years. That year may well have been adversely affected by the freeze on filling vacancies ahead of FFR, and industrial action, so is not a fair comparison. No mention is made of the Surrey appliance from Horley helping to achieve response times in Crawley during 2015/16. Incidents in Crawley increased by just under 1% in 2015/16, but there was a 13% increase in responses by the Surrey appliance from Horley (Mobilised to 129 Crawley incidents, plus an unknown number of standby moves to Crawley). This appliance has now been moved to Salfords, which will inevitably increase response times to Crawley for a third fire engine, and also for a second or first fire engine if one or both of Crawley’s are already committed. Any competent review also needs to include a look forward that takes account of known or anticipated changes 2.9.3 The conclusion is inadequate. The response time for a third fire engine was specifically mentioned in the outcome, but no data has been provided to assess the extent of the change in third fire engine response times. 2.10 Proposal 5 - Implement revised day crewing model at Variable Crewed Stations at Shoreham, Burgess Hill, Haywards Heath and East Grinstead 2.10.3 No information is given regarding changes to the amount of time devoted to community safety or the number of activities undertaken. These figures are required to assess if there has been an improvement or a deterioration. 2.10.4 The public were told that this proposal would “maintain response standards”, yet no figures are provided and the statement in the report suspiciously only refers to “standards across the service”. Response times for appliances at the Variable Crewed Stations have not been published, but appliance availability has fallen, which will inevitably have an adverse effect on response times. For first appliances the best last year was 97%, the worst was 87%. For second appliances the best was 52% and the worst was 30%. 2.11 Proposal 6 - Increase operational capacity and support for communities in flooding and other severe weather events Whilst this proposal may have provided useful additional equipment and training, it has not “increased operational capacity and support for communities”.  That capacity and support has been significantly reduced as a result of Fire Redesign and Future Fire & Rescue 2. The number of crews available to respond to incidents has been cut by 24%, which means far fewer people can be helped at busy times. 2.12 Proposal 7 - Reductions in management and Support Services It is difficult to believe that workload has been absorbed without any adverse effect on performance. Unless people had spare time on their hands, which is highly unlikely, the quality and quantity of work carried out will have suffered. This should be quantified. It is also of concern that the issues around the removal of station administrators were not identified during the planning for FFR. Anyone familiar with their work would know that the station administrators provided cost effective administration and vital continuity for stations. Their work allowed operational personnel to focus on their core operational and community safety functions. The loss of continuity and the loss of training and community safety time, as a result of operational personnel having to carry out station administration, were all perfectly predictable.  2.13 Proposal 8 - Utilise additional trained staff to improve operational resilience The consultation document specifically referred to “Staff would be mobilised and use spare appliances or those already at the incident”, yet no data is provided. Strangely though, there are a number of references to things that appear to have nothing to do with the proposal to “Utilise additional trained staff to improve operational resilience”. Such things as Exercise Tempest, the Emerging Leaders Project, improved fire-fighting media etc. All interesting, but a distraction from evaluation of the proposal. 2.13.16 The ‘Crewing Optimisation Group’ (COG) has clearly had some benefits, but it is under-resourced and the operating model does not match the times of greatest need. At best, according to the Cabinet Member, it can increase the number of retained appliances available by four. Yet, whilst it operates at times when there are already twelve wholetime crews available, it never operates at night and at weekends, when there are only eight wholetime crews available. There are shortages of retained personnel that need to be covered at night and at weekends, as well as during weekdays. 3 Consultation It is good to see that the report authors recognise the goodwill of staff, but disappointing that consultation has only been via focus groups. Whilst this has some value, personnel often feel inhibited in giving their views, especially when the interviewers were the ones who had promoted the changes. Proper consultation should be carried out via the representative bodies (Fire Brigades Union, Retained Firefighters Union, and Unison). They can obtain the uninhibited views of staff, which will better inform Members. 8.2 Equality Duty. As this is 8.2, it is not clear if this is an error, or if sections of the report are missing. This states that an Equality Impact Report is not required. However, it has ignored the more significant effects of the cuts on the rural poor, rural elderly and rural ethnic minorities. These groups are more vulnerable for a variety of reasons. For example, they are more likely to be in rented, older and less well maintained properties, where the risk of fire and the risk of becoming trapped is greater. With less access to public transport these groups also need their own cars, but can often only afford older second hand ones. These have fewer safety features than modern cars and may be less well maintained, so in a collision people are more likely to be trapped with more serious injuries. The report has also failed to address the more significant effect of the proposals on the elderly, poor and ethnic minorities in Crawley Borough. These people are statistically more likely to have fires and to need rescuing, so reducing the number of fire engines in Crawley will have unfairly had a greater impact on these vulnerable groups.

Differences in published outcomes

Proposal	Consultation Document	Report to Select Committee in 2014	Report to Select Committee in 2016
1	Improves Service performance by more effective use of resources.	Uses risk modelling to improve Service performance and make more effective use of immediate response resources. This proposal would result in a net reduction of one fire engine and seven posts.	Improve Service performance and make more effective use of immediate response resources. This proposal would result in a net reduction of one fire engine and seven posts.
2	Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance	Increased efficiency through a reduction of 19 posts whilst maintain existing crewing levels where possible. There will be no reduction in response standards.	Increased efficiency through a reduction of 19 posts whilst maintaining existing crewing levels where possible. There will be no reduction in response standards
3	Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance	Frees up resources with minimal impact on performance and improves flexibility for getting fire fighters to the incident using the 4x4 vehicles. Resources would be more proportionate to local risk and operational demand. Sending a second fire engine to an incident could take longer, depending on the location of incident. However, historically, the second engines at these stations have often been unavailable. For a two-engine incident near to the county border it is quicker to mobilise a crew from a neighbouring Fire Service so there should be no difference. This proposal would result in a reduction of three fire engines, but current Full Time Equivalent (FTE)staff at these stations will remain.	Frees up resources with minimal impact on performance and improves flexibility for getting firefighters to the incident using the 4x4 vehicles. Resources would be more proportionate to local risk and operational demand. Sending a second fire engine to an incident could take longer, depending on the location of incident. Historically, the second engines at these stations have often been unavailable. This proposal would result in a reduction of three fire engines, but current Full Time Equivalent (FTE) at these stations will remain.
4	Resources more proportionate to risk and performance	If both fire engines at Crawley were committed to an incident, a fire engine from a neighbouring station would be mobilised to standby at Crawley. Resources would be more proportionate to risk and operational demand. There would be a delay in the attendance of a third fire engine, if compared to those occasions when the current third fire engine at Crawley was available. This proposal would result in a reduction of one fire engine and 10 retained fire fighter posts with minimal impact on Service performance.	Resources would be more proportionate to risk and operational demand. There would be a delay in the attendance of a third fire engine, if compared to those occasions when the current third fire engine at Crawley was available. This proposal would result in a reduction of one fire engine and 10 retained firefighter posts with minimal impact on Service performance.
5	Changes to delivery of community safety work, maintains response standards at reduced cost	Increases the hours these stations provide immediate response from 50 to 60 hours per week through new shift working arrangements. Community safety work will be delivered in the same way it is delivered at immediate response stations. This proposal would result in a net reduction of two fire fighter posts (38 to 36 posts across four stations). Emergency response standards are maintained at reduced cost.	Increases the hours these stations provide immediate response from 50 to 60 hours per week through new shift working arrangements. Community safety work will be delivered in the same way it is delivered at immediate response stations. This proposal would result in a net reduction of two firefighter posts (38 to 36 posts across four stations). Emergency response standards are maintained at reduced cost.
6	Improved capability for preparing for, responding to and supporting the recovery from flooding and severe weather related events.	Improved capability for preparing for, responding to and supporting the recovery from flooding and severe weather related events.	Improved capability for responding to and supporting recovery from; flooding and severe weather related events.
7	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.
8	Improved operational resilience and more effective use of skills and resources	Improved operational resilience and support for major incidents and/or extreme weather conditions. This will be through implementing a more formal and robust arrangements, for the effective co-ordination and use of skills and resources	The improvement of operational resilience. Support for major incidents and extreme weather conditions, (or a combination of both). This will be through implementing more formal and robust arrangements for the effective co-ordination and use of skills and resources.

Hypocrisy alive and well in West Sussex

When anyone uses just two years’ data to report an increase in calls, or slower response times, West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service protest that it is not 'accurate or transparent'. So surely they would never do that?

Wrong! In the report to the County Council Select Committee, that is reviewing the effects of Future Fire and Rescue 2 (last year's cuts), over 70% of the statistics used by the Chief Fire Officer only compare 2014/15 and 2015/16. Disappointingly, they still claim that the 2015/16 ‘improvements’ endorse their changes.

To add to the inaccuracy and lack of transparency, they have previously protested that the figures for 2014/15 are unrepresentative, because industrial action reduced crewing and increased response times. To add to that, the freeze on vacant posts ahead of Future Fire & Rescue 2 will also have had an adverse effect on performance in 2014/15.

So I actually agree with West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service, their figures in this report are neither accurate nor transparent.

Another accusation they regularly regurgitate is ‘selective use of statistics’, but that is exactly what they have done in this report. You will remember the phantom ‘move a fire engine from Horsham to Littlehampton’ plan, when all they did was remove 23 firefighters from Horsham and increase the number at Littlehampton by 16.

There are several paragraphs about the effect of the change at Littlehampton, but there is absolutely no reference to the effect at Horsham. Presumably they have selectively excluded that data, because it would show a significant deterioration on second appliance response times in the Horsham area.

They also show how the availability of the first appliance at Littlehampton has improved from 92% to 100%, but don’t explain why the 2014/15 figure was not representative. The honest answer is that Future Fire and Rescue 2 has not made any difference to long term availability, as their figures for four years show.

Note: 2014/15 figures abnormally poor as a result of industrial action and the freeze on vacancies.

I also fail to understand why cutting the turnout time at Littlehampton for night calls by four minutes (day calls had already been cut), has only improved the average attendance time by just 28 seconds.

Among the many other inadequacies in the report, I must just mention the revised day crewing model at Shoreham, Burgess Hill, Haywards Heath and East Grinstead. Now this report is supposed to be reviewing the expected outcomes, which we were told would be a change to the delivery of community safety and ‘no change to emergency response’.

Now looking at other sections in the report, you might expect to see response times, availability figures and community safety statistics for at least 2014/15 and 2015/16, but no. Once again selectively omitted. Well here are the appliance availability figures, which strongly suggest that instead of no change’ to emergency response times, they must have got worse:

Note: 2014/15 figures abnormally poor as a result of industrial action and the freeze on vacancies.

We can only hope that, at today’s Select Committee meeting, County Councillors see that the report is a travesty and that they postpone discussion until they get a detailed and accurate report.

You can read the full ‘report’ via this link - Impact of Future Fire and Rescue 2

Performance information now on County Council website

Well at last West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service has been shamed in to putting some performance information on the County Council website. Unfortunately, there is no previous performance information for comparison, so it will take a while to see the real benefits of the information. For those not wishing to wait I can offer some past information for comparison. Beginning with the total number of incidents and the number of operational fire engines in service. You will note that the number of incidents is still well above the 1970's and early 1980's figures, but that the number of fire engines has been significantly cut.

It seems that WSFRS managers are avid readers of this blog and the Facebook page and they are always critical, even before they have checked the information for accuracy. So to clarify, all my information comes from their records or from government statistics. Their other regular misleading criticism is that the information is ‘selective’. To the extent that, if I am showing the cut in fire engines, then of course I am going to show the figures for the number of fire engines. After all it would be pretty silly to say ‘they have cut fire engines’ and then just show the change in the number of officer cars!

I also don’t have all the figures for every year, so can’t possibly show figures that I do not have. It is also unhelpful when they change how they record or present statistics, which means year on year comparisons can’t be made. A recent example is road traffic collisions. Now you would think it quite straightforward, one or more vehicles collide and the fire & rescue service is called, so that equals one call to a road traffic collision. 

Well that is how it used to be, but now it might not be recorded as a road traffic collision! Apparently, if they don’t do anything when they arrive, it will be recorded as a ‘false alarm’. As this defies common sense, you have to wonder why they want to mislead the public on how many road traffic collisions they attend. Perhaps these figures give a clue? 

Finally, a comparison chart for the availability of fire engines crewed by part time (Retained Duty System) firefighters. Now as recently as 2012, the advertised target for this was 88%, but mysteriously they later cut the target to 75%. You will note that they are even failing to meet that lowered target. Targets were supposed to be part of the Integrated Risk Management Plans, which are subject to public consultation. Yet the last IRMP consultation was in 2009, so who was consulted on the cut and did County Councillors approve it? 

The situation is clearly serious and Councillors were told in October that a major review of the Retained Duty System was underway and that there had already been wide consultation within the service. Yet nine months on, no report on the review has been published. More fiddling whilst West Sussex burns?

West Sussex County Council risk losing control of the fire & rescue service

Just had a chance to watch the recording of the latest County Council meeting. It started off well with Councillors from all parties vowing to fight the Police & Crime Commissioner’s plan to take control of the fire & rescue service. The Leader of the Council, Louise Goldsmith, rightly praised the good work of firefighters across the County, but then appeared to claim that this was because of how the Council runs the service.

As anyone who has followed their management of the service will know, Louise Goldsmith’s party has closed four operational fire stations, cut operational fire engines by 24%, left wholetime crewed fire engines with bare minimum crews, presided over a drop in retained fire engine availability from 90% to 60%, and ‘achieved’ an increase in response times.

The fire & rescue service’s operational and preventative achievements are the result of the determination and commitment of firefighters, and have little to do with County Council management. So the real issue is not the distraction of our firefighters’ achievements, but who should manage the service. I don’t believe that PCC control is the right way forward, but this County Council’s record is not a good one.

Just look at Mrs Goldsmith’s claim that their democratic accountability and transparency meets the Home Secretary’s aspirations. The Cabinet system has seriously reduced accountability and transparency in West Sussex, especially when Conservative Councillors are in the majority and won’t challenge their Leader. When other Councillors express concern about problems or failings in the fire & rescue service, Cabinet Member David Barling just dismisses their concerns and expects that to be the end of the matter. His recent refusal to let County Councillors investigate concerns is not democratic accountability, and failing to provide accurate performance information is certainly not transparent.

If you needed further confirmation of this, you only had to listen to David Barling later in the meeting. Dr James Walsh pointed out that Mr Barling had misled the Council at the last meeting when he said, “Hampshire Fire & Rescue don’t actually come a great deal in to West Sussex, approximately its about 50 times every year”. The average figure over the last five years is in fact 145 times per year, and that is just to attend West Sussex incidents. They also come in to West Sussex several times a year to standby at fire stations, but those figures are not even recorded. 

So, did Mr Barling apologise for misleading the Council? No, he misled them again by suggesting he was just talking about Emsworth. As you can see from the exact quote above he was not. To make matters worse, like some petulant teenager, he complained about the way Dr Walsh phrased the question. An accountable and transparent Cabinet Member would have humbly apologised for the error, assuming of course that it was a simple mistake and not an attempt to deliberately mislead.

Louise Goldsmith also suggested that West Sussex was meeting the Home Secretary’s aspirations for ‘greater collaboration with other emergency services’, and ‘opportunities for joint working and commissioning’, so is that true, or another weakness? Well, as Geoffrey Theobald, leader of the Conservatives on Brighton and Hove City Council, says, “I don’t think that West Sussex County Council are helping their case by continually rejecting a merger of the two brigades which both East Sussex County Council and Brighton and Hove City Council have supported over the years.”

In addition, West Sussex pulled out of a deal to merge vehicle procurement and maintenance with the other emergency services in Sussex and Surrey. Government funding was available for this project, but West Sussex decided to go solo with a part in-house and part private contract for this function. To give the illusion of it being an emergency services collaboration, they said it would be 'available' to other emergency services, yet it is in direct competition with the Surrey/Sussex project. 

Louise Goldsmith’s confidence that the Home Secretary would be convinced by her ‘excellent model’ is, I fear, sadly misplaced. Significant changes and improvements are required if she is to stand any chance of convincing Theresa May that the fire & rescue service is safe in her hands.