Inaccurate information at Fire & Rescue Service Scrutiny Committee

No response from Committee Chairman

It is over two weeks since I emailed the Chairman of the Fire & Rescue Service Scrutiny Committee, regarding my concerns that his committee was incorrectly told that there is a national performance standard for answering '999' calls. This inaccurate claim was being used to justify abandoning the standard of answering 98% of '999' calls within 7 seconds. 

The originally agreed performance standard was 100% of '999' calls within 7 seconds, so there has already been a mysterious cut.

Key Performance Indicators in the legal agreement between Surrey and West Sussex County Councils

We are not talking about dealing with the call, just the time taken to accept the call from the '999' operator. Simply, the time it takes for a control operator to raise a hand and touch the '999' line on the computer screen. In any properly staffed, equipped and managed fire control, most '999' calls should be accepted in less than two seconds, so the seven second standard can be considered generous. 

Cutting the standard from 100% in 7 seconds to 95% in 10 seconds is unjustified

It is not a national performance standard, it is just an agreement by all the emergency services to try and ease the pressure on British Telecom, who operate the '999' service. An agreement that acknowledges that much busier police control rooms, which are also subjected to more regular spikes in demand, would struggle to meet a higher target.

Had there been a genuine national performance standard for the fire & rescue service, which my research had not uncovered, then I would have expected Councillor Boram, or the Chief Fire Officer, to have informed me of it by now. However, I have heard nothing. As I believe it is a matter of public concern, I have shown the full content of my email at the end of this post.

Legitimate Concerns

The performance standard they wish to lower is not measuring staff performance, it is measuring delivery of the service. Poor performance statistics, and plans to drop performance standards, show that my concerns about Joint Fire Control are justified. However, that should not be misinterpreted as criticism of the staff working there. The performance standard depends on many other factors, including the number of staff on duty, the workload, equipment, policies, procedures, training, and local knowledge. Even the best control operators cannot make up for deficiencies in those areas.

That the average last year showed 5.8% of calls were not answered within 7 seconds indicates all is not well. 

Another indication that all is not well is that Joint Fire Control only managed to alert West Sussex fire stations, within 2 minutes of the '999' call being received, for just 84% of incidents last year (2020/21 Statement of Assurance). 

This standard has also been mysteriously cut from 100% to 98%.

Key Performance Indicators in the legal agreement between Surrey and West Sussex County Councils

This also does not compare favourably with the performance of the Sussex Fire Control, which handled West Sussex calls before this arrangement with Surrey. In the months before the changeover, despite using what was described as equipment well overdue for upgrading, Sussex Fire Control was alerting fire stations within 2 minutes for 94% of incidents. 

Source: WSFRS Performance Report 2020-21 Quarter 3 (Changeover of Controls date added)

Surrey County Council, which manages the Joint Fire Control, committed to these performance standards. On behalf of residents, West Sussex County Council should insist on them being achieved.

Lowering standards is not the answer, the failure to achieve them should be investigated and action taken to improve performance

Unfair Accusations

Whilst sorting through old documents, I came across a unique group photo of West Sussex fire control staff from 1983. I thought it would be of interest to those on a Facebook group for serving and former West Sussex staff. Numerous favourable comments show it was well received, yet one serving officer chose to link it to the current fire control problems.

I have steadfastly avoided any reference to current problems on that group, as it is a non-political group for sharing memories and news of retirements etc. When I posted the photo I simply said, "When West Sussex operated its own fire control, which supported crews and served the public so very efficiently." The officer chose to comment, "As our Fire control continues to do to this day Tony Morris". 

I have never criticised fire control staff for the current problems, so I responded with "Did I say otherwise? I did not, as I thought we wanted to keep political comment out of this group." Incredibly, he then said that the "implication is clear". It is disturbing that he decided to ignore what was actually written and decided to invent implications that were not there. He is a group administrator and deleted my reasonable reply, alleging it violated the group rule to "be kind and courteous."

He also messaged me and suggested I was trying to turn everything into part of a "bitter vendetta". It was distressing that he sees my campaigning for a properly funded and resourced fire & rescue service, which properly supports the public and staff, as a "bitter vendetta". I asked him to explain what I am supposed to be bitter about, but I have had no response. 

I have always supported the service and have only ever wanted what is best for the public and for those who work in the service. My public campaigning could only begin once I was no longer employed by West Sussex County Council, and that coincided with Council plans to reduce the capability and effectiveness of the service even further. I was particularly concerned that the cuts were being dishonestly touted as 'improvements', so I explained why they were not improvements and why they would be damaging. Deteriorating service performance since then has shown that those concerns were justified. 

It was disappointing at the time, but not surprising, to learn that certain senior officers, who have now left, told Councillors I was a 'disgruntled former employee'. A shabby and dishonest tactic to deflect attention from the issues. It also appears the tactic was employed to mislead serving personnel. Fortunately, those who know me saw it for the dirty trick it was and have been very supportive of my efforts.

So, let me be clear, I have nothing to be bitter about regarding West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service or West Sussex County Council. There is no vendetta, just legitimate criticism of changes that my professional experience tells me are not in the best interest of the public or of fire & rescue service staff. 

I am not critical of dedicated staff in the service.

My criticism is of politicans who have damaged the service, of inadequate political scrutiny, and of poor decisions by some former principal officers.

Email to Kevin Boram, Chairman of the Fire & Rescue Service Scrutiny Committee

25 January 2022

Dear Councillor Boram,

   It was disappointing to hear your committee being misinformed with the inaccurate claim that answering 95% of 999 calls in 10 seconds is a national performance standard. There are no common standards set for emergency service control rooms, as each service has different requirements, procedures, demands, and information requirements. Were national standards to be set for fire & rescue service control rooms, then they would be set by the Home Office.

The Public Emergency Call Service (PECS) code of practice referred to is produced by the 999/112 Liaison Committee, which is a consultative committee that discusses matters arising from the provision of the 999/112 emergency call service. The setting of performance standards is not included in their terms of reference (see below), as it would be inappropriate for a consultative committee that includes commercial telecommunication providers to set standards for public emergency services.

 

Past research has shown that fire service control rooms can answer and process emergency calls more quickly than ambulance and police control rooms. This is not because ambulance and police call handlers are inefficient, but because they have different demands and information requirements that are specific to their services. This includes those services receiving significantly more 999 calls than fire & rescue, the nature of those calls often requires call handlers to spend more time on each call, and they are subjected to many more spikes in demand than fire & rescue. Despite this, the NHS target for ambulance services was set, just a few years ago, at 95% of 999 calls to be answered within 5 seconds.

 

The PECS figure, of answering 95% of 999 calls in 10 seconds, represents an earlier police target and was included in the PECS document to acknowledge the greater demands made on the police service. If the Joint Fire Control is properly staffed, equipped and run, then there is no reason why the standard originally agreed with Surrey, of 98% within 7 seconds, should not be met. 

It should be noted that Ofcom require BT plc, which operates the 999 call handling centres, to answer 95% of 999 calls within 5 seconds. They achieve that with just 6 call centres handling over 30 million 999 calls a year, so it is reasonable to expect Joint Fire Control to exceed, not just meet, the original agreed standard for just 30,000 incidents a year.

 

I should add that I am not suggesting that your committee was misinformed intentionally, but I believe the Chief Fire Officer has also been misinformed or misunderstands the status of the PECS code of practice.

 

It should surely be the role of scrutiny committees to keep performance standards high to ensure the best service to the public. Lowering standards can only result in a loss of motivation to strive for good performance. Seconds count when lives are at stake, and it is the public who suffer as a result of low standards.

I would urge you to require the original standard, 98% within 7 seconds, to be restored. I also hope the committee will get to the bottom of why Joint Fire Control has been failing to meet this agreed standard and to then require improvements.

Yours sincerely,

 

Tony Morris

999/112 Liaison Committee Terms of Reference

 

The Committee provides a forum to discuss operational and technical matters arising from the provision of the 999/112 emergency call service. Its main concern is the effective handling of emergency telephone calls between the public, call handling agents and the emergency authorities.

 

The Committee seeks to ensure that:

■ each interest group has an understanding of the needs of the others;

■ problems are identified and resolved;

■ call handling is efficient and effective;

■ there are agreed protocols for the management of calls;

■ technical and other developments, including European requirements, are identified and actioned in a timely manner;

■ the wider requirements of UK and European law are satisfied;

■ opportunities for the development of future emergency call processes or systems are considered and/or identified, and where appropriate these are highlighted to the 999/112 Strategic Group;

■ changes to public use of the 999/112 infrastructure are considered, whether that be as a result of technological changes or changing habits, to ensure that the best possible service can continue to be provided;

■ advice is provided to the 999/112 Strategic Group on technical or operational matters as necessary.

Standards cut to hide Fire Control failures & worst WSFRS performance for 18 months

Joint Fire Control failure cover up

Papers before today's Fire & Rescue Service Scrutiny Committee meeting reveal West Sussex County Council's shabby plan to drop their agreed standard for the Joint Fire Control to answer 98% of '999' calls within 7 seconds. This is something that any well staffed and efficient fire & rescue service control room should be able to achieve.

Yet since the joint Surrey/West Sussex Fire Control began dealing with West Sussex emergencies, they have consistently failed to meet this standard.

False claim

To make matters worse, they are dishonestly claiming that answering 95% of '999' calls in 10 seconds is a national performance standard. It is nothing of the sort. They have hijacked this from the Code of Practice for Public Emergency Call Service document, which is merely a working agreement between communications providers and the emergency services.

Unlike a proper performance standard, which focuses on keeping the public safe, this is simply an agreement by the emergency services to help communications providers reduce the time they spend on transferring calls. It is not about public safety, but about freeing up '999' call handler time, so communications providers, like BT, won't need to employ more staff.

This agreement was mostly about what police and ambulance services could achieve with their significantly higher call volumes. It is not an acceptable standard for fire & rescue services. Surrey County Council, who manage the Joint Fire Control, must be required to deliver their promised level of service. 

There is no legitimate excuse for Joint Fire Control failing to answer 98% of '999' calls within 7 seconds. That standard must remain in place and be met.

Failing to alert fire stations on time

Not only is the Joint Fire Control missing their target for answering '999' calls, they are also failing to ensure that fire stations are alerted within 2 minutes of the emergency call being received on 98% of calls.

The excuses offered in the report for consistently being over 10% below standard do not stack up. The previous joint East/West Sussex Fire Control faced exactly the same challenges and performed much better.

The 'deep dive' review promised in the report is to be welcomed, but these failings suggest there are fundamental weaknesses in this Joint Fire Control. Concerns have already been raised about a failure to ensure there are enough staff available, and there may be other problems contributing to these failures. 

Questions have to be asked about whether this so called 'state of the art' mobilising system is part of the problem (there have been reports from others using the same system of slow running at times), is it the loss of local knowledge, is it unnecessarily time consuming procedures, is it inadequate training etc? 

Whatever lies behind this unsatisfactory performance, which delays help reaching West Sussex residents, it must be fixed urgently. 

Poor performance

The performance report for the second quarter of 2021-22 shows the worst decline of the last six quarterly reports. Fourteen of the thirty core performance measures are worse, with some being the worst for 18 months.

Those affecting how quickly help reaches people in trouble are the most troubling. In addition to the fire control failures, overall response times for the first fire engine to arrive at critical fires and at critical special services, such as road traffic collisions with people trapped, are the worst of the last six quarters. 

The latest figures show that they failed to achieve the generous response target times (12 minutes for 37% and 14 minutes for 61% of the County) at a shocking 17.5% critical fires. 

The target for those needing rescue from crashed road vehicles and from other hazardous situations is 13 minutes, yet in the latest quarter shown the failure occurred on nearly one in four emergencies.

You will also notice the worrying downward trendline on these graphs. Sadly, the underlying reasons for these performance failures is West Sussex County Council's funding and staffing cuts.

Despite these being core measures in the West Sussex County Council Plan, they have not been selected for examination by the Scrutiny Committee.

We keep getting excuses about the failure to properly crew Retained (On Call) fire engines, but little effective action. Things continue to get worse.

Proposals 2 and 3 in the Community Risk Management Plan consultation, which will see extra wholetime firefighters employed, is the first measure likely to improve this poor performance. Those proposals should be supported. 

However, I am concerned they may be too little, and they are certainly too late to help the many West Sussex residents who have had to wait an unacceptably long time for help to arrive.

Between them, Government and West Sussex County Council have inflicted serious damage on the Fire & Rescue Service's effectiveness to help those in trouble. 

They both need to do more.

Serious concerns about inadequate Surrey fire control

At their meeting on Monday, the Environment, Communities and Fire Scrutiny Committee will discuss the Chief Fire Officer's progress report on the Improvement Plan, which followed Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services inspection report. The full report to the Scrutiny Committee can be found in the agenda reports pack.

Some progress, but not all good news

It is pleasing that quite a bit of progress seems to have been made on improvements, but reference to the "successful implementation of the Fire Control project" appears to be misplaced. Information from reliable sources suggest a number of things have gone wrong, including mobilising failures, incomplete turnout instructions and delays. No doubt we will be told they were teething problems, but if implementation was "successful" there would be no such problems. There are also concerns that some back up options, which were available when West Sussex had its own control, are no longer there.

Inadequate staffing

The most worrying aspect about Surrey control also handling West Sussex emergencies is inadequate staffing. Something I warned about a year ago:

"Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) recently rated Surrey Fire & Rescue Service as inadequate. Their report included criticism of inadequate staffing in Surrey's control room." 

Reports from inside the service said:

With the possibility of East Sussex Fire & Rescue Service also opting to use Surrey for their call handling, staffing could become even more inadequate. East Sussex are only having to consider this because West Sussex County Council decided to waste millions of pounds by pulling out of the combined Sussex control. If East Sussex do decide that using the Surrey control is the only viable option, they must do a better job and insist on much better staffing.  

When the WSCC Environment, Communities and Fire Scrutiny Committee looked at the plans to use Surrey, there was a lot of discussion about technology but not about staffing. Just one question was asked and the then Chief Fire Officer told Members that he would ensure there would be enough staff. However, following answers to a written question from Councillor Michael Jones last month, we now know that was not done. 

Minimum staffing to handle emergencies in Surrey and West Sussex is just five for about 21,000 incidents a year. Minimum staffing when West Sussex ran their own control was four (9,000 incidents) and minimum staffing in the Sussex control, when serving East & West Sussex, was seven (18,500 incidents). 

The population of the area directly affects the number of incidents handled in a year and therefore control operator workload. Using Home Office data, the graph below shows the ratio of incidents and population per control operator, when at the respective minimum staffing levels.

It is quite impossible for the Surrey control to provide the level of service West Sussex residents have rightly come to expect. At busy times they will simply not have enough staff to ensure that emergencies in both counties can be handled quickly and effectively. Surrey County Council is effectively ripping off West Sussex County Council by charging a lot of money for a worse service.

It seems that senior officers in both Surrey and West Sussex have been so dazzled and preoccupied with technology, they forgot about the most important component of any emergency service control room - Control Operators. 

Important though good technology is, it is only ever an aid to Control Operators. They are the ones who have to answer every '999' call, extract the essential information required from sometimes distressed and confused callers, and then ensure the right resources are dispatched. And that is just the beginning. A routine emergency can generate dozens of Control Operator actions, a serious incident can require hundreds of actions and major incidents can require thousands. 

Control rooms can go from being quiet, with no incidents to deal with, to frenetic activity within seconds and dozens of emergencies needing a response within a few minutes. The only way to ensure that the public get help quickly and effectively is to employ adequate numbers of skilled and motivated Control Operators. Surrey have failed to do that and West Sussex have allowed them to.

Hidden performance standards and targets reassure no one

The written answer, provided last month, also said that, "there are numerous performance standards with targets assigned" to the agreement with Surrey, but failed to give any details. The only way County Councillors can scrutinise Surrey Control's performance, and the public can learn the real effects of this contract, is for those performance standards and targets to be published. We also need to see the figures for Sussex Control's performance, so that fair comparison is possible.   

Previous national data showed that the Surrey control took, on average, twice as long as the Sussex control to handle calls. Councillors were wrongly told that this was because Surrey "call challenged" and Sussex did not. The truth is that both controls use call challenging when necessary. Call challenging does however carry risks. Used properly it can prevent resources being sent to hoax calls, but it can also result in a delayed response to genuine calls and, in the worst cases, no response to genuine emergencies. It must only ever be used sparingly and cautiously.  

Assurances given to the committee have not been honoured,

Members must ask why and insist on improved staffing.

'Inadequate' Surrey Fire & Rescue Service to control West Sussex emergencies

Relief at the saving of safety and prevention jobs, when West Sussex County Council recently dropped planned cuts, was short lived, as jobs at the Sussex Control Centre are now under threat. Cabinet Member Debbie Kennard has approved plans to transfer call taking, mobilising, and management of resources and incidents for West Sussex emergencies from the Sussex Control Centre to Surrey Fire & Rescue Service. 

This is despite Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) recently rating Surrey Fire & Rescue Service as inadequate. Their report included criticism of inadequate staffing in Surrey's control room. 

Now when I read the report of the recent Select Committee meeting by Karen Dunn (local democracy reporter), I had expected to see which councillors asked probing questions and who responded to those questions. All vital elements of democratic reporting I would have thought. However, there was none of that, and what I read looked more like a County Council press release. With only the Cabinet Member, Chief and Deputy Chief Fire Officers named in the report, I was concerned that Councillors on the committee had failed to question the plans.

Fortunately, I was able to view a recording of the meeting and was reassured that some very intelligent and pertinent questions had been asked by Councillors, in particular by Michael Jones and Simon Oakley. Sadly, the answers were less reassuring, especially about staffing and poor performance in Surrey’s control. It was frustrating that there were not many follow up questions, but I appreciate that Councillors are not subject matter experts, so are limited in how deep they can probe.

Whilst I don’t doubt the sincerity of the officer responses, I was left feeling that they did not fully understand the complex issues involved. It has always concerned me that many people, including senior fire service officers, often lack a detailed knowledge of the operation of a control room and consequently underestimate the requirements.

An emergency service control room is not just a call centre where staff simply follow a script on the screen in front of them, type a few details in to a database and then declare ‘computer says yes’, or ‘computer says no’. Control room staff have to quickly assess information, make critical decisions, communicate effectively internally and externally, and manage ever changing resources. Technology can assist them, but the final decision and many interactions depend on well trained control room staff.

Only those who have worked in, or spent considerable time in control rooms, and studied the processes, interactions and decisions required in an emergency service control room can properly make decisions about change. In the past, West Sussex control room staff provided vital input to such decisions, but West Sussex no longer employs control room staff, so has no pool of expertise.

During my time in both the fire service and emergency planning I gained a very good insight in to control room operation and I have seen and experienced first-hand the effects of good and bad control room operation. I have also studied good practice and serious failures elsewhere, and worked locally, regionally and nationally on resilient communications. That is why, after reading the reports and listening to the discussion at the Select Committee meeting, I still have serious concerns.

Staffing

The report and the discussion concentrated on technology, but failed to properly consider the most important component of any emergency service control room – adequate numbers of well trained and capable staff.

Emergencies, by their nature, are random events that can dramatically increase demand on control room staff without warning. That can result in delays in answering ‘999’ calls, delays deploying resources, delays responding to requests from crews at incidents, and delays liaising with other emergency services and organisations necessary to ensure that incidents are dealt with quickly and effectively.

In properly staffed control rooms those delays are rare and have minimal effect on the response. In understaffed control rooms those delays occur much more frequently and have a significant effect on the service given to the public. In the worst cases it can cost lives.     

The Councillors were told about other fire & rescue services taking calls when Surrey is busy, but were not told, as reported by HMICFRS, that those services cannot mobilise fire crews. They still have to pass the call to Surrey's Control, when they eventually manage to get through, and only then will Surrey Control staff mobilise crews to the emergency.

Government figures indicate that Surrey’s control room is currently understaffed by over a third. Adjusting for the number of calls received, compared to Hampshire and Sussex, Surrey should have at least 34 control room staff, but they only have about 25.

To effectively deal with West Sussex and Surrey calls to an acceptable standard, Surrey would need to more than double the current number of control room staff. Yet reports suggest they only intend to increase staffing by one per shift, which would seriously undermine effective response in both Surrey and West Sussex.

Incident and staffing data from Home Office figures averaged over previous 3 years

CFO Gavin Watts said that staffing was still being discussed, yet costs have been agreed, which suggests that Surrey Fire & Rescue has already decided how many staff will be employed. The CFO stated that he would ensure enough staff, but based on what standard, Surrey’s poor standard or Sussex and Hampshire’s responsible standards?

Technology

I also have concerns about the reassurances given regarding technology and communications. That Surrey’s technology works with their infrastructure is no guarantee that it will work with that in West Sussex. Just because suppliers say equipment and systems can handle the significant extra demand is no guarantee that it will. If internet service providers, telecom providers and major financial institutions, with their resources, can screw up system upgrades, data transfers etc., then I cannot be reassured that two councils, three fire & rescue services and Capita will get it right.

After all, similar assurances were given by Government about Regional Fire Controls, but they failed to get the technology to work. Subsequently assurances were given by West Sussex County Council about the Sussex Control Centre, but the new mobilising system took over five years to fix. When it eventually went live in East Sussex, further assurances were given by the Cabinet Member about using it for West Sussex calls, but she later decided to abandon the Sussex Control Centre.

A far more accurate statement would be ‘we hope it will work’.

A key requirement will be ensuring that links between the Surrey control room and West Sussex fire stations and appliances will not be vulnerable to any single points of failure. Michael Jones asked if there would be two or three separate links, but was only given an answer about existing West Sussex resilience. The vital Surrey/West Sussex links were not addressed.

Executive Director Nicola Bulbeck suggested that as the fire & rescue service was part of the County Council’s IT set up, it was better than if it was a standalone fire authority. There is no evidence to support that claim. It is far more likely that an IT department in a standalone fire authority will be fully focused on the special needs of the fire & rescue service, rather than trying to balance that with needs across the entire County Council.

My experience of working with WSCC and Capita IT departments is that they cope with the core IT needs of the Council, but often struggled with the specialist IT and communication requirements and extra resilience required by both fire & rescue and emergency planning. IT policies, planning and technology designed to meet the needs of the whole County Council often frustrated efforts to meet specialist needs.

I gained the impression from the responses at the meeting that officers had been seduced by possible technological benefits, whilst being less aware of the vulnerabilities and challenges that ever changing technology creates.

Local knowledge

It was disappointing to hear Gavin Watts dismiss local knowledge as a red herring. Carol Purnell made a valid point about local unofficial names and terms, but the issue is much wider than that. The information given to control room staff by the mobilising system depends on the accuracy of information provided by a potentially panicking caller and the accuracy of the data in the system. Both can be inaccurate and result in crews being sent to the wrong location when the operator lacks local knowledge.

It was suggested that caller locations can be identified with technology, but that is only true for conventional landlines. Although even they can present challenges with modern phone divert and number transfer options. Exact locations cannot be given for mobile phone callers, only the location of the mobile phone mast the caller is connected to.

Even more challenging is increasing use of the internet for voice calls. The location provided to control operators will not be the location of the caller, but of the site where the call leaves the internet and enters the telephone network, which may be many miles away.

The only safeguard is local knowledge. I have experience of control operators with local knowledge ignoring the mobilising system recommendation and sending us to the correct location, and also of control operators, who lacked local knowledge, sending us to the wrong location. 

When it is right, technology is a great boon, but when it is wrong you need staff with good local knowledge. It is also vital when the technology fails, which can and does happen. Trained operators with local knowledge and basic paper information can still get fire crews to emergencies.  

Who is in charge?

Initially, the responses at the meeting seemed more reassuring, with talk of joint management and operations boards for the control room, but as the discussion progressed it became clear that Surrey will always have the final say.

Michael Jones asked about Surrey’s crewing problems impacting on West Sussex, but was told that was Surrey’s concern. It may be, but if the Surrey control room starts plugging gaps in their fire cover with West Sussex crews it will undermine effective fire cover in West Sussex. It is a fundamental matter that must be addressed.

Similarly, it was indicated that it is up to Surrey if they wish to deal with calls for other services. Unless staffing is increased that could well see West Sussex calls suffering even worse delays. That did not seem to concern the officers, which is worrying. West Sussex must have a say in staffing requirements, if Surrey want to increase the workload of control staff.

This is a very good deal for Surrey, as council taxpayers in West Sussex will be heavily subsidising their control room costs. Much was said about best value, but best value is not just the cheapest option. For there to be value there also has to be a reliable and effective service for West Sussex residents.

The lack of detail, the secret reports, the unanswered questions, and Surrey’s history of cutting corners on staffing do nothing to reassure West Sussex residents and firefighters that they will be safe.

July Update

December Update Part 2

• Less help from Hampshire Fire & Rescue for West Sussex residents
• Sussex Fire Control concerns
• Councillors misled
• Council elections in May
• Mid Sussex deserves a 24-hour immediate response crew
• Government dishonesty
• Response time failures
• Are we really safer?
• WSCC’s anti-Crawley bias
• What is our safety worth?

Fire Control Failure - London now, Sussex next?

London Fire Brigade Mobilising System Crashes Again!!!

How long before this happens in the Sussex Fire Control, if it has not already happened. Over four years ago we were told that the mobilising system used by West Sussex was in need of replacement and that a new system to cover both East & West Sussex would be provided in 2013.

When the Sussex Fire Control finally went operational in May 2014 there was still no new system. They are having to operate with the original and separate mobilising systems, which require more staff to operate them. Staff they don't have. In March this year, ESF&RS (who run the combined centre) refused to say how many times the long awaited combined mobilising system has failed acceptance tests. They claimed the information was exempt under Section 42(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

West Sussex used to record mobilising errors, so that the cause could be identified and action taken to stop a repeat. Incredibly, ESFRS could not provide any information on mobilising errors! They said, "This information is not recorded by ESFRS and therefore we do not hold the information requested". If they don't record this information, they cannot stop the same error being repeated.

To maintain what they call a "flexible" minimum of seven on duty in the control room, overtime was required on 425 shifts last year (West Sussex previously had a minimum of four on duty for their system). Describing a minimum as "flexible" suggests that, when it suits, the minimum is sometimes lower. They also deny reports that there have been times when non-Sussex Fire Control staff have had to be used to operate mobilising or radio positions in the control room.

It is clear that staff in the Sussex Fire Control are having to work with inadequate equipment, inadequate crewing and are having to work excessive overtime. Inadequate crewing on fire stations also means that they are constantly battling to deploy decreasing resources, even before a single call is taken. When simultaneous or serious incidents have to be dealt with, the additional pressure on them must be enormous.

Sussex Fire Control staff deserve our praise and thanks, but both East Sussex Fire Authority and West Sussex County Council should be condemned for this dangerous mess.

Consultation - West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service Community Risk Management Plan

Well I have submitted my response to the West Sussex Fire & Rescue Service consultation, which closes on Friday this week. The 'additional comments' (item 2) are reproduced below and if anyone wishes to include any of the text in their response, then please feel free to do so.

"This document does not meet the requirements of an Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP), and even fails to deliver as a Community Risk Management Plan. Much of the information in the document may be useful in a general information brochure, but the absence of key information on the outcomes of the last IRMP and plans for dealing with future risk makes this an inadequate IRMP.

Despite a statement that ‘Station Profile’ and ‘County Profile’ documents are produced each year and are available on the website, I have been unable to find them on the website. Even a search for them only resulted in ‘Sorry, no results were found’ being displayed.

The dubious selection of figures for fire deaths seems intended to disguise the failure to deliver on the 2010-15 IRMP’s statement that fire deaths would be reduced. The latest figures, that would show accidental dwelling fire fatalities for 2015/16, have been omitted and, oddly, figures for 2004/05 have been included. That is presumably to misrepresent the situation by starting the chart with a particularly high number of fire deaths.

According to Government figures, the actual deaths for the period of the last IRMP were 28, compared to the previous five years when there were just 13. So instead of a reduction they have more than doubled.

The 2010-15 IRMP also said that WSFRS would “look at new and creative options to maintain cover and continue to attract new retained recruits.” Not only has WSFRS failed to do this, but changes to contracts, training and management of Retained Duty System (RDS) personnel have made things worse.

Mysteriously, the retained appliance availability target of 88% in 2011/12 has been cut to 75%. Despite the serious implications, this has apparently been done without any consultation with either the public or with County Councillors. Yet even this reduced target is not being met and average availability has fallen from 87% in 2009/10 to 59% last year. Some stations have even dropped from 100% to just 30% availability during that period.

The failure to address this problem suggests that WSFRS is happy to allow the retained service to wither and die. This is evidenced by inadequate efforts to stop the decline and the repeated process of removing lower availability RDS crewed fire engines from service. Nine have been cut so far. Clues to the root causes of these failures may be shown in a recent national survey of RDS firefighters by the Retained Firefighters Union. The results showed that 69% did not feel their service was doing enough to resolve the problem, and 60% felt that they were undervalued by Principle Officers.

The only way WSFRS is going to properly tackle the RDS problem is by working with communities, County Councillors, Parish Councils, local business and community groups, partner agencies, the South Downs National Park Authority and others. Much is made of partnership working, yet on this critical problem WSFRS seems intent on avoiding the involvement of anyone that may be able to help find new and creative options.

Whilst the Crewing Optimisation Group may seem a useful interim solution to the RDS crewing difficulties, it is expensive as a long term solution and fails to cover all periods of RDS crew shortages. Operating it when there are 12 wholetime crews available, but not operating it when there are only 8 wholetime crews on duty suggests a lack of planning. Especially as there are times, during the periods that the Crewing Optimisation Group is not available, when RDS shortages are as bad as they are when the Crewing Optimisation Group is available.

There continues to be an inadequate assessment of risk and an even more inadequate provision for dealing with it. The last IRMP is claimed to have resulted in “a considerable reduction in the number of ‘Very High’ Critical Fire risk areas”, yet no evidence can be found to support this claim. It appears that this may not be an actual reduction of risk, but simply a slight drop in the number of calls received in some areas.

The risk to individual lives and property remains, and the risk of losing lives or property is actually greater in areas classed as ‘low risk’, because it takes longer to get firefighters to those areas. The risk to life is particularly high in respect of road traffic collisions, with the more serious ones tending to occur in rural areas. Not only are response times greater, but WSFRS is failing to meet target times for one in four incidents.

Neither is the provision matched to the risk or the volume of calls. Crawley continues to be the fire station area requiring the most fire & rescue service responses in the County. In addition, this document says that the population in that area is expected to increase by 25%. Yet, WSCC has cut the number of fire engines and crews in Crawley from five to two. There is a correlation between population and number of calls, yet this document has no proposals to deal with an inevitable increase in emergencies in the Crawley area. 

The document states, “We use analytical resources, such as computer modelling software, to help us predict risk and assess the likely impact of changes”. Unfortunately, history shows that the results of that modelling are ignored when it does not suit the Council’s political agenda. Modelling of proposed changes in 2010 was reported, as it showed no increase in deaths or property damage. Yet when modelling of the cuts in 2015 showed an increase in deaths and property damage, efforts were made to disguise and later discredit the modelling.

It is reassuring that WSFRS recognises the reduction in firefighter experience of real fires. However, extra training at the Fire Service College is not enough. The cut in wholetime firefighter numbers and the shortage of retained firefighters have made it difficult to maintain skills with continuation training, and at the same time maintain adequate fire cover. In house training facilities need to be improved and more firefighters must be employed to enable training facilities to be used without undermining fire cover.

The document includes the Sussex Control Centre (SCC) in the list of specialist teams in WSFRS, when in fact the SCC is operated by East Sussex Fire & Rescue Service (ESFRS). The Control function is effectively contracted out. No mention is made of the worrying fact that the combined mobilising system, that was fundamental to the improvement of the control function, is now three years overdue. ESFRS has refused to state how many times the combined mobilising system has failed acceptance tests and they have given no indication of when this problem will be resolved.

Other problems with the SCC are not mentioned, including the excessive amount of overtime required to maintain minimum staffing levels. In 2015/16, overtime was required on 425 shifts. Of particular concern is that, unlike the previous WSFRS Fire Control, the SCC does not record mobilising errors. If they are not recorded, then problems are not being identified and remedial action cannot be taken.

The document states that around half the incidents attended by WSFRS were false alarms. It is concerning that this number has been artificially increased by classifying attendance at some road traffic collisions as false alarms, simply because no action was required when the service arrived. To describe an actual road traffic collision that the service attended as a false alarm is misrepresenting the facts and the work of the service. Will attendance at actual fires that are out on arrival be the next to be misrepresented as false? 

The document states, “our change in operating model has not altered the emergency response standards we agreed with you in 2009”. Yet it fails to inform the public that those standards are not all being met and that the degree of failure has increased. In particular for both fire engines arriving at critical fires and for the first fire engine arriving at critical special services.

The addition of the High Volume Pumping Unit is to be welcomed, but it does not offset the loss of 11 fire engines. Storms and flooding primarily require a large number of standard fire engines to respond to the high volume of emergency calls received in a short space of time. WSFRS is now less well prepared to respond to the predicted increase in severe weather events and no improvements are planned.

The claim that this is a ‘Community Risk Management Plan’ is dubious. Despite fine claims about integration, this document has little or no mention of the smaller units now controlled by the Chief Fire Officer, the legislation covering their work, or any plans for their future work. These smaller departments seem to be completely overshadowed by the fire & rescue service and their effectiveness seems to have suffered as a result.

A recent example being the Council’s latest IT Strategy report. The Civil Contingencies Act and resilience are not mentioned, yet resilience of such a core facility, which is essential to all WSCC services, should be a key strategic objective. If the Council cannot meet their legal obligations on such a fundamental report, there is little hope of them setting an example to others.

Finally, the inadequacy of the consultation. There are just two sections on the ‘Plan’, one of which contains four questions designed to get a favourable response, and the other is simply blank for additional comments. Yet there are seven sections about the person submitting the response!

There are no questions about the public’s views on deteriorating fire engine availability, or on increasing failures to meet response times. Both are of significant concern to the public and they are entitled to be properly informed and invited to comment. They should also be asked if they consider £33.68 per person per year is sufficient to spend on their protection. I consider it inadequate and I am sure many others would agree.

Firefighters continue to do a superb job, but the decreasing support they receive from the County Council is a disgrace. The public also deserve a much more open, transparent and accountable fire & rescue service. This Community Risk Management Plan does little to meet those objectives. Sadly, it’s inadequacies will simply strengthen the Police & Crime Commissioner’s case to take control of the fire & rescue service."

Sussex Police & Crime Commissioner's false Fire & Rescue Service claims

It appears that Katy Bourne, the Conservative Police & Crime Commissioner who is keen to take over the Fire & Rescue Services in Sussex, is in her own fantasy World. In a newsletter last month, she said:

"In Sussex, the two fire services already have a joint centre in Haywards Heath that handles 999 calls. This has saved £4m over 5 years and led to better attendance times and improved coordination of resources across the county."

Well that is pretty amazing for a ‘joint centre’ that has been operational for less than two years! As for her ‘better attendance times’, the last published figures showed that response times for house fires increased in West Sussex by 13%  and in East Sussex by 14%. For fires in other buildings the increase in East Sussex was 16%, and for outdoor fires in West Sussex it was 17%.

Of course there is also no evidence of 'improved coordination of resources', something the previous separate controls did exceptionally well. I wrote and asked her to correct her false statements, but despite her claim to reply within 14 working days, I have heard nothing. 

Fortunately, both the Labour (Michael Jones) and Liberal Democrat (James Walsh) candidates are on record as not supporting Fire & Rescue Services being taken over by Police & Crime Commissioners.

Katy Bourne should focus on the many challenges facing the Police, instead of trying to expand her empire. The two services have different functions, procedures, training and responsibilities, and their independence is vital. Both the Police and the Fire & Rescue Service will suffer if they are forced in to an arranged marriage, and it is the public who will pay the ultimate price.