Not a report, just a Councillors’ Comfort Blanket

Well it seems that Councillors on the Environmental and Community Services Select Committee failed to carry out a proper review of last year's cuts, and simply accepted the misleading report presented by the Chief Fire Officer last week. 

Quite frankly a complete farce, designed to be a comfort blanket to help Councillors sleep easy in their beds. Never mind the public often having to wait longer for help to arrive, or firefighters facing increased danger, because their crew size has been cut and assistance is coming from further away.

Sadly I am not surprised. A report, put together by the same people who recommended the cuts, is hardly going to admit their proposals have made things worse. Similarly, the Select Committee that failed to properly assess the proposals, and then approved them, is hardly going to admit they got it wrong.

Did any Councillors challenge the report? With the meeting not available in the Council's webcast library, we have no way of seeing if they did or not. Having said that, the ruling group on the County Council has a reputation for dismissing any challenges and voting as instructed. 

Another example of a complete lack of transparency and accountability, which I am sure the Police & Crime Commissioner will use to strengthen her case to take over the running of the fire & rescue service! The County Council may protest about the take over, but they ineptly continue to make it easier for her.

For those who want to know why the report was such a whitewash, consider the following:

Summary 1. The report authors improperly say that discussion by Members should be restricted to the "actual outcomes against the expected outcomes". To be a proper review, all the effects resulting from the cuts should be examined and discussed. 2. There are no reports from the representative bodies, so balanced consideration of the effects is not possible. 3. The wording for some of the expected outcomes in this report differ from that in the final report to the Select Committee in 2014. This is inconsistent and no explanation is given for the change. 4. Most of the statistics only cover 2014/15 and 2015/16, which, as WSFRS has said before, is unrepresentative. It is quite inappropriate to draw any conclusions without showing data for at least the previous five years. 5. This is especially inappropriate, as WSFRS has previously stated that the data for 2014/15 is unrepresentative, because industrial action had an adverse effect on their performance. In addition, the freeze on vacant posts ahead of Future Fire & Rescue 2 will also have had an adverse effect on performance that year. 6. There are a few examples where three or four years are referred to in the report, but the selection of the additional data for those examples is questionable and unexplained. 7. Data appears to have been selected and presented in a way that some negative effects are concealed and positive ones are misrepresented. 8. Previous statistical data referred to average (or mean) figures, but this report is using median figures. That means they cannot be properly compared. Median figures may well appear better than average figures. 9. Essential data, which would indicate if the outcomes had been achieved and identify any adverse effects, has been omitted. Examples include: Proposal 1 – there is no data at all in relation to the outcome at Horsham. Proposal 2 – no data for the second immediate response appliances at Crawley and Worthing. Proposal 3 – no data on the impact of the changes on first appliance response times. Proposal 4 – no data on the impact of the changes to third appliance response times at Crawley. Proposal 5 – no data on response times and community safety work. Proposal 6 – no data on operational capacity and support for communities. Proposal 7 – no data on work or time lost as a result of the changes. Proposal 8 – no data on the use of additional trained staff to improve operational resilience. In short, this report is incomplete and misleading. It also lacks sufficient accurate data to justify the conclusions shown.  Detailed comments Scope of review Any review of major change must be in depth, unrestricted, and especially not limited to just the ‘expected outcomes’. Unexpected outcomes, knock on effects and overall performance must also be considered? The views of those directly affected by the change must be considered, as they can often have a better insight regarding the real effects. In particular, the representative bodies (Fire Brigades Union, Retained Firefighters Union, and Unison) should have been invited to submit their observations. There have been worrying reports that the personnel reductions are undermining initial and continuation training, with personnel running out of specialist qualifications. That is also reported to have resulted in some fire appliances responding to calls without a crew able to deploy breathing apparatus. The response times will hide this serious deficiency, as that appliance may well have arrived within the target time, but rescue and effective firefighting will have been considerably delayed until an appliance from another station arrives. Concern has also been voiced about special appliance availability being similarly affected. All such concerns should be fully reviewed by the Committee. It is also odd that the wording for some of the expected outcomes is not consistent in the Consultation Document, the final report to the Select Committee in 2014, and in this report (see table at the end for detail). In the following sections, I have used the outcome’s that were notified to the public. Selection of data WSFRS has often criticised the use of statistics for just two adjacent years, because they say they are unrepresentative. Whilst such figures are of some use for a simple year to year comparison, they are clearly not representative of trends and should not be used to draw conclusions. To identify the true overall effect of cuts, they must show the figures for at least the five years before Fire Redesign in 2010 and for all subsequent years. The use of just 2014/15 data to indicate the situation before the Future Fire & Rescue 2 cuts is even more dubious, as WSFRS has previously claimed that industrial action meant that performance was poor and data for 2014/15 unrepresentative. That year’s figures will also have been undermined by the freeze on vacant posts that preceded the decision on FFR 2. It is accepted that with post-change data only being for one year, that cannot be used to draw full conclusions. However, it can indicate areas of concern that should be addressed or monitored. It is particularly important that the Select Committee also fully review the effects for at least another four years. Median or average data The change from average to median data is a concern, as that means they cannot be properly compared. Now this may just be confusion on the part of the authors, as 2.6.8 refers to “median (average)”, which suggests they are the same, but they are not. Average is the arithmetic mean, whereas median is the midway point between, for example, the quickest and slowest response time. A simple illustration of how use of the median can mislead would be five response times of 5, 7, 8, 15, and 20 minutes. The median is 8 minutes, but the proper average is 11 minutes. It is essential that this is clarified to ensure that data is consistent across the years. It would also be helpful to gain perspective on average figures, if the best and worst times were also shown. Mitigation Much was made of things that would be done to mitigate the effect of the changes, yet the report fails to mention what has actually been done, or how effective it has been. For example, the plan to send the 4x4 with additional personnel to critical calls in the Midhurst, Petworth and Storrington areas. Has that been done for every critical call, has it been effective etc?  All the actions proposed to mitigate the effect of cutting crews should be reviewed to see if they have been effective, or if more measures are required. 2.6. Proposal 1 - Move one of the two immediate response fire engines at Horsham to Littlehampton, making it a 24-hour immediate response station No fire engine was moved, only firefighters were moved or cut. The public were told that this proposal, “Improves Service performance by more effective use of resources”. To justify that the effect on both Horsham and Littlehampton should be reviewed, but there is no data provided for Horsham. Thus only showing improvements, whilst hiding performance deterioration. Response times for a second appliance, will have generally increased by four minutes for both day and night calls at Horsham. By contrast, the four minute reduction at Littlehampton is only for night calls. Average response times for a second appliance in Horsham’s area have not been published, but their second appliance’s availability has been. This will clearly have an adverse effect on response times, so it is concerning that availability has dropped from 100% in 2014/15 (when it was wholetime crewed) to 76% in 2015/16 (now that it is RDS crewed). With no mention of Horsham, the conclusion for proposal 1 is simply false. In addition: 2.6.6 – Had the performance figures for the first appliance at Littlehampton been shown for previous years, instead of just the previous year, the improvement would be negligible (2012/13 = 99.96%, 2013/14 = 100%). The unusual drop in 2014/15 was almost certainly a consequence of not filling vacancies and disillusionment amongst personnel whilst changes were being discussed. 2.6.8 – Littlehampton’s first appliance crewing was changed from immediate response in the day and retained response at night, to round the clock immediate response, thus removing the extra 4 minutes on response times at night. There was also a considerable capital and revenue cost with this proposal, so to only have an improved overall response time of just 28 seconds is worrying. 2.7. Proposal 2 - Introduce ‘Group-Crewing’ model at immediate response stations: Bognor Regis, Chichester, Crawley, Horsham, Littlehampton and Worthing. This claimed there would be “Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance”, but no evidence was offered to support that contention in the Modelling and Analysis Technical Report. The claim that the change would “maintain existing crewing levels where possible” was always a questionable claim and concern was voiced during the consultation. Riding with four firefighters, instead of five, for 60% of the time is far from maintaining existing crewing levels. It is also concerning that the prediction claimed in 2.7.5 has not previously been published. 2.7.3 According to this report the first year was “predicted to be a year of adjustment”, so why were Members not told of these predicted issues in the final report to the Select Committee in 2014? 2.7.7 The figures for 2014/15 may well have been adversely affected by the freeze on filling vacancies ahead of FFR, so it is not a fair comparison. In addition, the Chief Fire Officer has previously claimed that industrial action increased response times in 2014/15, so this will also have contributed to performance being abnormally low that year.  2.7.8 The second fire engines at Crawley and Worthing were also affected by this change, but the second fire engine response times and availability have not been included. It is understood that those second fire engines have not always been crewed, and that they have also been sent to other station areas to provide cover, thus removing cover from Crawley and Worthing.  This is important data in relation to determining if the outcome has been achieved. 2.7.9 The conclusions are illogical. The Littlehampton improvement is claimed to be “almost certainly” due to the change in crewing, but the deterioration at Chichester is claimed to be “variations in performance from year to year”. So the 2015/16 improvement at 5 of the 6 stations could in fact just be a one off favourable variation in performance, which may deteriorate next year. 2.8 Proposal 3 - Remove the 2nd fire engines at Midhurst, Petworth and Storrington, leaving one fire engine and 4x4 vehicle at each station The response times for the first appliances at these stations are also likely to be have been affected by the change, but no data is provided. Removing 50% of the appliances in this area significantly reduces resilience, so when the only remaining appliance at each station is not available (at another call, standing by at another station, or has no crew) the response time for the first appliance to arrive at a call will increase significantly. A proper assessment of the outcome of this proposal must include the change in first appliance response times. 2.8.3 This claims that “critical attendance standards have been maintained”, but the 2015/16 figure is actually 3% below target. Figures prior to 2014/15 are also needed, if a proper assessment is to be made. 2.8.5 The claim was that this proposal would have a “minimal impact on performance”, yet response times for second appliances have fallen dramatically. Not meeting response times on 62%, 79% and 90% of occasions indicates a serious impact on performance. This is very worrying when you realise that, for most of these station areas, that means taking longer than 17 minutes to arrive. 2.9 Proposal 4 - Closure of retained unit and removal of 3rd fire engine at Crawley. Based on low utilisation it does not contribute significantly to overall performance and existing emergency cover arrangements 2.9.2 The claim that “whenever both appliances are attached to incidents, a standby appliance is mobilised to Crawley” is not supported by evidence. It cannot be, as whenever statistics for appliance movements for standby purposes have been requested by Members or others, they are told that such movements are not recorded. Once again, only the previous year’s response times are shown, instead of several preceding years. That year may well have been adversely affected by the freeze on filling vacancies ahead of FFR, and industrial action, so is not a fair comparison. No mention is made of the Surrey appliance from Horley helping to achieve response times in Crawley during 2015/16. Incidents in Crawley increased by just under 1% in 2015/16, but there was a 13% increase in responses by the Surrey appliance from Horley (Mobilised to 129 Crawley incidents, plus an unknown number of standby moves to Crawley). This appliance has now been moved to Salfords, which will inevitably increase response times to Crawley for a third fire engine, and also for a second or first fire engine if one or both of Crawley’s are already committed. Any competent review also needs to include a look forward that takes account of known or anticipated changes 2.9.3 The conclusion is inadequate. The response time for a third fire engine was specifically mentioned in the outcome, but no data has been provided to assess the extent of the change in third fire engine response times. 2.10 Proposal 5 - Implement revised day crewing model at Variable Crewed Stations at Shoreham, Burgess Hill, Haywards Heath and East Grinstead 2.10.3 No information is given regarding changes to the amount of time devoted to community safety or the number of activities undertaken. These figures are required to assess if there has been an improvement or a deterioration. 2.10.4 The public were told that this proposal would “maintain response standards”, yet no figures are provided and the statement in the report suspiciously only refers to “standards across the service”. Response times for appliances at the Variable Crewed Stations have not been published, but appliance availability has fallen, which will inevitably have an adverse effect on response times. For first appliances the best last year was 97%, the worst was 87%. For second appliances the best was 52% and the worst was 30%. 2.11 Proposal 6 - Increase operational capacity and support for communities in flooding and other severe weather events Whilst this proposal may have provided useful additional equipment and training, it has not “increased operational capacity and support for communities”.  That capacity and support has been significantly reduced as a result of Fire Redesign and Future Fire & Rescue 2. The number of crews available to respond to incidents has been cut by 24%, which means far fewer people can be helped at busy times. 2.12 Proposal 7 - Reductions in management and Support Services It is difficult to believe that workload has been absorbed without any adverse effect on performance. Unless people had spare time on their hands, which is highly unlikely, the quality and quantity of work carried out will have suffered. This should be quantified. It is also of concern that the issues around the removal of station administrators were not identified during the planning for FFR. Anyone familiar with their work would know that the station administrators provided cost effective administration and vital continuity for stations. Their work allowed operational personnel to focus on their core operational and community safety functions. The loss of continuity and the loss of training and community safety time, as a result of operational personnel having to carry out station administration, were all perfectly predictable.  2.13 Proposal 8 - Utilise additional trained staff to improve operational resilience The consultation document specifically referred to “Staff would be mobilised and use spare appliances or those already at the incident”, yet no data is provided. Strangely though, there are a number of references to things that appear to have nothing to do with the proposal to “Utilise additional trained staff to improve operational resilience”. Such things as Exercise Tempest, the Emerging Leaders Project, improved fire-fighting media etc. All interesting, but a distraction from evaluation of the proposal. 2.13.16 The ‘Crewing Optimisation Group’ (COG) has clearly had some benefits, but it is under-resourced and the operating model does not match the times of greatest need. At best, according to the Cabinet Member, it can increase the number of retained appliances available by four. Yet, whilst it operates at times when there are already twelve wholetime crews available, it never operates at night and at weekends, when there are only eight wholetime crews available. There are shortages of retained personnel that need to be covered at night and at weekends, as well as during weekdays. 3 Consultation It is good to see that the report authors recognise the goodwill of staff, but disappointing that consultation has only been via focus groups. Whilst this has some value, personnel often feel inhibited in giving their views, especially when the interviewers were the ones who had promoted the changes. Proper consultation should be carried out via the representative bodies (Fire Brigades Union, Retained Firefighters Union, and Unison). They can obtain the uninhibited views of staff, which will better inform Members. 8.2 Equality Duty. As this is 8.2, it is not clear if this is an error, or if sections of the report are missing. This states that an Equality Impact Report is not required. However, it has ignored the more significant effects of the cuts on the rural poor, rural elderly and rural ethnic minorities. These groups are more vulnerable for a variety of reasons. For example, they are more likely to be in rented, older and less well maintained properties, where the risk of fire and the risk of becoming trapped is greater. With less access to public transport these groups also need their own cars, but can often only afford older second hand ones. These have fewer safety features than modern cars and may be less well maintained, so in a collision people are more likely to be trapped with more serious injuries. The report has also failed to address the more significant effect of the proposals on the elderly, poor and ethnic minorities in Crawley Borough. These people are statistically more likely to have fires and to need rescuing, so reducing the number of fire engines in Crawley will have unfairly had a greater impact on these vulnerable groups.

Differences in published outcomes

Proposal	Consultation Document	Report to Select Committee in 2014	Report to Select Committee in 2016
1	Improves Service performance by more effective use of resources.	Uses risk modelling to improve Service performance and make more effective use of immediate response resources. This proposal would result in a net reduction of one fire engine and seven posts.	Improve Service performance and make more effective use of immediate response resources. This proposal would result in a net reduction of one fire engine and seven posts.
2	Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance	Increased efficiency through a reduction of 19 posts whilst maintain existing crewing levels where possible. There will be no reduction in response standards.	Increased efficiency through a reduction of 19 posts whilst maintaining existing crewing levels where possible. There will be no reduction in response standards
3	Increased efficiency and no reduction in performance	Frees up resources with minimal impact on performance and improves flexibility for getting fire fighters to the incident using the 4x4 vehicles. Resources would be more proportionate to local risk and operational demand. Sending a second fire engine to an incident could take longer, depending on the location of incident. However, historically, the second engines at these stations have often been unavailable. For a two-engine incident near to the county border it is quicker to mobilise a crew from a neighbouring Fire Service so there should be no difference. This proposal would result in a reduction of three fire engines, but current Full Time Equivalent (FTE)staff at these stations will remain.	Frees up resources with minimal impact on performance and improves flexibility for getting firefighters to the incident using the 4x4 vehicles. Resources would be more proportionate to local risk and operational demand. Sending a second fire engine to an incident could take longer, depending on the location of incident. Historically, the second engines at these stations have often been unavailable. This proposal would result in a reduction of three fire engines, but current Full Time Equivalent (FTE) at these stations will remain.
4	Resources more proportionate to risk and performance	If both fire engines at Crawley were committed to an incident, a fire engine from a neighbouring station would be mobilised to standby at Crawley. Resources would be more proportionate to risk and operational demand. There would be a delay in the attendance of a third fire engine, if compared to those occasions when the current third fire engine at Crawley was available. This proposal would result in a reduction of one fire engine and 10 retained fire fighter posts with minimal impact on Service performance.	Resources would be more proportionate to risk and operational demand. There would be a delay in the attendance of a third fire engine, if compared to those occasions when the current third fire engine at Crawley was available. This proposal would result in a reduction of one fire engine and 10 retained firefighter posts with minimal impact on Service performance.
5	Changes to delivery of community safety work, maintains response standards at reduced cost	Increases the hours these stations provide immediate response from 50 to 60 hours per week through new shift working arrangements. Community safety work will be delivered in the same way it is delivered at immediate response stations. This proposal would result in a net reduction of two fire fighter posts (38 to 36 posts across four stations). Emergency response standards are maintained at reduced cost.	Increases the hours these stations provide immediate response from 50 to 60 hours per week through new shift working arrangements. Community safety work will be delivered in the same way it is delivered at immediate response stations. This proposal would result in a net reduction of two firefighter posts (38 to 36 posts across four stations). Emergency response standards are maintained at reduced cost.
6	Improved capability for preparing for, responding to and supporting the recovery from flooding and severe weather related events.	Improved capability for preparing for, responding to and supporting the recovery from flooding and severe weather related events.	Improved capability for responding to and supporting recovery from; flooding and severe weather related events.
7	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.	Reduced costs in management and administrative functions.
8	Improved operational resilience and more effective use of skills and resources	Improved operational resilience and support for major incidents and/or extreme weather conditions. This will be through implementing a more formal and robust arrangements, for the effective co-ordination and use of skills and resources	The improvement of operational resilience. Support for major incidents and extreme weather conditions, (or a combination of both). This will be through implementing more formal and robust arrangements for the effective co-ordination and use of skills and resources.