Friday was a depressing day for anyone concerned with fire
safety and the fire & rescue service.
First, we learnt from local news that, following last year’s
fire, the Trust running the Selsey Academy does not intend to fit sprinklers
when they rebuild the school. Professional advice and common sense say that
sprinklers should be fitted, but TKAT (The Kemnal Academies Trust) say they
won’t, because they are “not a
requirement”. Well, it is not a requirement to look for traffic before
crossing the road, it is just a recommendation, but only a fool does not do so.
TKAT claim, “Our
pupils are at the heart of everything we do”, but this shows that they are not.
They may believe their procedures will protect the lives of pupils, but major
school fires have many other consequences. Studies have shown that they have a
detrimental effect on pupils’ education, which leads to lower than
expected achievement. They cause emotional distress for staff, pupils and the
wider community. They also have a negative impact on the school’s social life,
and an economic impact on the school, local authority, parents, staff and
community groups.
Not forgetting of course, that such fires pose a danger to
firefighters and to nearby property. All these negative effects and risks can
easily be avoided by fitting sprinklers, which is comparatively cheap in a new
building. This selfish and short-sighted decision begs the question, what other
recommendations and good practice do TKAT ignore, simply because they are “not a
requirement”? TKAT, who run a dozen schools in West Sussex, must reconsider and
do the right thing for pupils, staff, local residents and firefighters.
The second shock was the revelation, on BBC Newsnight, that
firefighters might have saved everyone in Grenfell Tower, if senior managers
had made different decisions before the incident.
Crucial amongst them was the policy decision to no longer
automatically send an aerial appliance to high-rise building fires.
Firefighters had to request one, which meant it arrived over half an hour after
the first call. I believe that there was every possibility that the external fire
spread could have been stopped, if the aerial appliance had arrived in 11 minutes
(time it took to arrive after being requested), instead of taking 32 minutes to get there.
The other fundamental issue, which the presenter easily recognised, but ex-Chief
Fire Officer Ronnie King failed to recognise, was the absence of a plan B. We
know that fires in this sort of building are supposed to stay in the flat of
origin, but we also know that things can sometimes go wrong. Yet, it seems fire
service planning, procedures and equipment only ever allowed for plan A. If everything
and everyone does what is expected, then that is fine, but if not you need a plan B.
I have to say that Ronnie King’s comments were very disappointing and illustrated by his comment, “I wouldn’t want to criticise any policy of London Fire Brigade”.
This fire appears to have spread beyond the flat of origin because of alterations, but there are many other situations where plan A will
not work and a plan B becomes essential. For example, explosions that damage the structure. These can result from gas leaks, gas cylinders, illegal drug labs or bomb making. They
can range from something as simple as fire doors not being shut, or fire
spreading via open windows, to damage caused by a light aircraft hitting the
building.
Cuts made in 2014 inevitably slowed the response to the
Grenfell Tower fire. Six central London fire stations were closed and other
fire stations lost their second fire engine, so reinforcing fire crews had to
travel further and took longer to arrive. There was also a delay in getting
extended duration breathing apparatus to the incident. With a high probability
of it being needed in a high-rise building fire, why was it not on the
initial response?
Both the aerial appliance and extended duration breathing apparatus issues suggest a worrying
complacency amongst senior fire service managers, or a lack of experience, or inadequate
risk assessment, or a blinkered mindset, or all of those.
The communication problems resulted from both equipment and
procedural limitations, but these are not new. So why has nothing been done to
overcome them? As for water supplies, I am not surprised that Thames Water
claim there was no problem. It would not be the first time they denied responsibility and then later, when that did not work, claimed it was someone
else’s fault. However, unlike other countries, there are no legal requirements for water
companies to provide a specific quantity and pressure of water for
firefighting in the UK. This was not such an issue when water supply was in public
ownership, but things seem to have deteriorated with privatisation. Perhaps another
issue in need of reform.
So, how would West Sussex cope with such a fire? Well, I
understand that WSFRS do send an aerial appliance as part of the initial
response to a high-rise building fire. A positive, but tempered by the fact
that, for many parts of the County, the response time could be over 30 minutes
and in worst cases over an hour. With greater distances, fire station closures
and the removal of a quarter of frontline crews in West Sussex, standard fire engines would also take much longer to arrive than they did in London.
I am not aware of WSFRS having any extended duration
breathing apparatus, or where the nearest would be. Water supplies and
communications are unlikely to be any better and could well be worse than in London. If anyone
can clarify these points, I would like to hear from you.
As for plan B, I don’t have confidence that this has been
considered in West Sussex. Risk assessment seems to have been focused on
finding excuses to cut resources, rather than reasons to ensure that the public
and firefighters are properly protected. When you realise that someone in WSFRS
looked at the problems posed by larger aircraft, with more passengers and fuel,
and then decided to reduce the service’s response to aircraft emergencies, it is
difficult to have confidence in plan A, let alone plan B!
I believe one of the significant problems in relation to
both stories is applying business planning methods to the public sector. In the
business world, if it will cost more to produce something than you will get
back in sales, then you don’t do it. If you are already doing it, then you stop
doing it. In the public sector there are no sales, so in the cost/benefit analysis
the costs are easily worked out, but the benefits are less tangible.
So, for the Selsey Academy, did they include in the benefits
column not damaging pupils’ education, not causing emotional distress to staff,
pupils and the wider community, not harming the school’s social life, avoiding an economic
impact on the school, local authority, parents, staff and community groups, not
putting neighbouring properties at risk, and not endangering the lives of
firefighters? I suspect not.
In the case of the Grenfell Tower tragedy, were assessments prepared
regarding the decision to no longer send aerial appliances to high-rise
buildings, and before cutting the number of aerial appliances in LFB? If they
were, I am sure that the benefits column did not include avoiding dozens of
fire deaths. It is also telling that in every city in the rest of Europe and in North America, one or more aerial appliances would have been sent immediately to a fire in a building like Grenfell Tower.
It is simply not good enough for anyone, be they property
owners, fire service managers or politicians, to increase the risk to the
public and firefighters. Lessons must be properly learnt, acted on, and never forgotten.